The Fed is writing the rules for the next Treasury panic while markets are calm
A Cleveland Fed president argues the central bank should decide in advance when it would step into the $32 trillion Treasury market. New Fed research shows why the plan could fail: banks fear the market reaction to borrowing.
- The US Treasury market is valued at $32 trillion, and it suffered turbulence in March 2020 and April 2025. m:…9585
- Cleveland Fed President Hammack argues the FOMC should set principles in advance for when and how it would intervene in Treasury markets. m:…9585
- Investors became more sensitive to banks' weaknesses after a first trip to the Discount Window, with sensitivity to uninsured deposits and bank capital rising significantly 4 to 7 days after borrowing. m:…7967
- Investors showed no concern when banks took a first loan from the Bank Term Funding Program, which was new and carried no history of stigma. m:…7967
- Governor Waller says traditional payment rails and central bank money remain essential for the stability of the payment system as tokenization develops. m:…0027
Decide now, not in the panic
The United States Treasury market is valued at $32 trillion, and it has seized up before: it experienced turbulence in March 2020 and again in April 2025. Cleveland Fed President Hammack, speaking at the Brookings Institution, argues that the Federal Open Market Committee should establish principles now for when and how it would intervene in Treasury markets, rather than improvising in the next panic. Her case rests on a simple chain: Treasury market dysfunction can spread into the real economy, and rapid selling of Treasuries can depress their value regardless of creditworthiness. The time to decide is while conditions are calm. m:…9585
Hammack's principles come with limits. Fed intervention should be considered if Treasury market dysfunction spills into the real economy, but the Fed should not intervene when poor liquidity reflects market fundamentals. Any intervention should be temporary, targeted, and include an exit strategy. She supports enhancing standing repo operations, and suggests repo operations could be linked to the FedNow service for earlier fund availability. If repo operations prove insufficient, Treasury purchases may be necessary. m:…9585
The stigma problem
There is a catch, and it comes from the Fed's own research. A New York Fed study finds that investors became more sensitive to bank weaknesses after a first trip to the Discount Window, with sensitivity to uninsured deposits and bank capital rising significantly 4 to 7 days after borrowing. Banks may resist borrowing from the Federal Reserve during a panic if such borrowing is stigmatized, and stigmatized borrowing hampers the Federal Reserve's ability to resolve a crisis. Discount Window stigma spiked during the 2007-08 financial crisis. Fed borrowing is anonymous, with individual borrowers disclosed only after two years, but the market still notices. m:…7967
The contrast in the study is the Bank Term Funding Program. Investors did not show concern when banks took a first loan from the program, and there was no significant change in investor risk perceptions for banks using only the program. The program was new, carried no history of stigma, and was aimed at the specific problem banks faced in March 2023. The Discount Window accepts a wide range of collateral and provides short-term loans against market value, while the program provided loans of up to one year against the face value of high-quality securities. The design difference mattered more than the money. Publicly traded banks are particularly sensitive to market opinion regarding borrowing, which is why the stigma binds. m:…7967
The rails underneath
The third piece of the week's picture comes from Governor Waller, speaking about payments and tokenized markets. Traditional payment rails and central bank money remain essential for the stability of the payment system, he argues, even as tokenization develops. Tokenization is in the early stages of competition between new entrants and established firms. The message is the same as Hammack's in a different register: the old plumbing still carries the system, and it has to be ready before it is tested. m:…0027
Put together, the three contributions describe one problem from three sides. Hammack wants the rules for intervention written before they are needed. The New York Fed's research shows that the tools the Fed already has can go unused because banks fear the signal that borrowing sends. Waller's point is that the payment rails underneath everything still rest on central bank money. The implication is that the next crisis plan has to solve for market psychology as well as liquidity: a backstop banks will not use is not a backstop. m:…9585 m:…7967
What is still unresolved
- Whether the FOMC will adopt formal intervention principles, and what they would say
- Whether a redesigned facility can avoid the Discount Window stigma the New York Fed documents
- How tokenized payment systems will interact with traditional rails as they scale
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