After October's turbulence, allocators are re-testing three old answers
Cambridge Associates says the case for equity long/short funds survives only where managers show real stock-picking skill. RBC BlueBay argues today's securitized credit is not the pre-crisis version. Meketa says the risks no longer sit in separate boxes.
- Recent market turbulence in July and October 2026 has renewed concerns about crowded AI-related positions in equity long/short hedge funds. m:…7973
- No AAA-rated CLO has ever taken a loss, and the global securitized credit market has grown to $5 trillion, RBC BlueBay says. m:…3356
- Artificial intelligence, interest rates and inflation are increasingly interconnected, impacting risk evaluation and portfolio construction, Meketa says. m:…5328
- Managers can correctly assess a business's prospects yet fail to withstand adverse price moves if position sizing, leverage and liquidity are not managed. m:…7973
Do long/short funds still earn their keep?
Artificial intelligence is creating opportunities for skilled equity long/short managers to identify companies with misjudged earnings prospects, according to Cambridge Associates. But recent market turbulence in July and October 2026 has renewed concerns about crowded AI-related positions in equity long/short hedge funds. Prime brokerage reporting documented episodes of long selling and short covering in October 2026 that reduced gross exposure. AI disruption could produce increasingly divergent earnings prospects across technology businesses and the industries they serve. Situational Awareness is a high-profile example of how concentrated, leveraged thematic bets can amplify losses in equity long/short portfolios. m:…7973
The test Cambridge sets is about skill, not exposure. Managers can correctly assess a business's prospects yet fail to withstand adverse price moves if position sizing, leverage and liquidity are not managed. Managers need to assess who retains the economic benefits of AI productivity gains to identify alpha opportunities. Due diligence should examine how managers assess crowding, size positions relative to liquidity, and manage leverage through drawdowns. Repeated losses from similar exposures warrant particular scrutiny by investors. Investors can achieve sensitivity reduction to broad equity market movements more cheaply by combining passive equities with cash, which is the benchmark the fees have to beat. m:…7973
Is securitized credit different now?
RBC BlueBay makes the case that today's securitized credit is not the pre-crisis version. GFC-era issues were caused by specific practices in subprime mortgage lending and its securitizations, not securitization itself. Modern CLOs hold senior secured loans to operating businesses with first-lien claims on company assets. Risk retention requirements now require loan originators to retain an economic interest in securitized assets. CLO 1.0 bonds recorded substantially lower defaults than global corporate credit through the GFC, and no AAA-rated CLO has ever taken a loss. m:…3356
The market has also grown into the argument: the global securitized credit market has grown to $5 trillion. Synthetic re-securitizations such as CDO-squared are no longer present in the marketplace in the same format. Typical CLOs hold 150 to 300 loans across multiple industries with concentration limits, loan-by-loan disclosure is now standard, and mandatory due diligence for institutional investors has been implemented since the GFC. m:…3356
The risks connect
Meketa's contribution is the shortest and the most unsettling. Institutional investors are currently managing a variety of competing issues including artificial intelligence, interest rates and inflation. Those three are increasingly interconnected, impacting risk evaluation and portfolio construction. The point is that the diversifiers in the first two sections cannot be judged in isolation: a long/short book and a CLO book now share the same underlying risks. m:…5328
The common thread is that October's turbulence did not settle anything. The hedge fund case survives only for managers who can show stock selection and risk control. The securitized credit case rests on reforms made since the crisis. And the risks themselves are moving together. Allocators are not being asked to pick a side this week; they are being asked to check whether the answers they already own still hold. That is the work the turbulence created: not new positions, but new questions about old ones. m:…7973 m:…5328
What is still unresolved
- Whether equity long/short managers can show the stock-selection skill Cambridge says the case depends on
- Whether today's securitized credit structures hold up in a real downturn
- How allocators should model risks that no longer sit in separate boxes
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