Two circuits, three rulings: the week in federal gun law

One statute, three answers

Three federal appellate decisions handed down on October 13, 2026, pulled 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) — the federal gun-possession statute — in different directions. The Ninth Circuit kept a drug-user possession conviction in place — which suggests a narrowing path for future challenges. The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld disarming a felon whose record showed violent threats — and in a separate case held the same subsection unconstitutional as applied to a man whose felonies were non-violent DUIs. The implication is that they map where the post-Bruen law of disarmament is settling: not on the label 'felon,' but on dangerousness. m:…5554 m:…9380 m:…7335

These three opinions land on three different theories — (g)(3) drug users in the Ninth, where circuit precedent controlled the outcome; (g)(1) violent felons en banc in the Third; (g)(1) non-violent felons as-applied in the Third. This suggests the law of disarmament is settling less around the 'felon' label and more around dangerousness. m:…5554 m:…9380 m:…7335

Ninth Circuit: Stennerson survives Hemani

In United States v. Youngblood (No. 24-7629), the Ninth Circuit affirmed a conviction under § 922(g)(3), which bars firearm possession by unlawful users of controlled substances. The panel's key move was precedential: the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Hemani (608 U.S. 772) was, in the panel's words, a 'narrow one' that did not address presently intoxicated possessors — so the circuit's earlier United States v. Stennerson (150 F.4th 1276) remains good law and controlled the outcome here. m:…5554

The panel, in an opinion by Judge Richard C. Tallman, added a practice pointer with teeth: Youngblood's as-applied Second Amendment challenge was deemed waived because it was not argued specifically and distinctly in the opening brief. For defense counsel, the implication is that the courthouse door on as-applied § 922(g)(3) challenges stays open — but only for briefs that walk through it properly. m:…5554

The Hemani move is worth understanding precisely. The Supreme Court's decision was, as the Supreme Court itself put it, a 'narrow one' that did not address efforts to ban presently intoxicated people from possessing firearms — so, the panel held, it could not render Stennerson 'clearly irreconcilable,' the test for displacing circuit precedent. The district court had separately found § 922(g)(3) constitutional as applied to Youngblood on a historical tradition of temporarily disarming intoxicated individuals. The implication is that neither ruling closes the door on future challenges; both narrow the path. m:…5554

Third Circuit, en banc: violent predicates can be disarmed

In United States v. Bost, the Third Circuit sitting en banc affirmed the denial of James Bost's motion to dismiss a § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession charge. Writing for the court, Judge Stephanos Bibas held that 'We hold that some predicate crimes (like Bost's conviction for terroristic threats) demonstrate a prima facie risk of physical violence from misusing guns and that those convicted of such crimes may presumptively be disarmed based on those convictions alone.' m:…9380

The opinion rejected both a facial challenge — the statute can be validly applied in some circumstances — and a vagueness challenge, finding § 922(g)(1) gives fair notice. It also placed the burden at the motion-to-dismiss stage on the government to justify disarmament from the predicate crime alone — a procedural detail this suggests prosecutors will now have to build into every § 922(g)(1) indictment. m:…9380

The opinion also cleaned up loose ends: it upheld the ban on stolen guns under § 922(j) as applied in his case, and confirmed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The through-line of the en banc decision appears to be burden allocation: the government justifies disarmament from the predicate conviction alone at the pleading stage, and the defendant then has to show the predicate does not signal dangerousness. m:…9380

Same circuit, opposite result: non-violent DUIs

Then came Williams v. Attorney General, where a Third Circuit panel affirmed a district court judgment holding § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to Edward Williams, whose predicate felonies were non-violent DUI convictions. The court's reasoning: the Second Amendment protects the right of all citizens to keep and bear arms for self-defense, historical tradition permits disarming only those who pose a present physical danger, and the 'felon' label is a modern statutory creation — crimes punishable by more than a year — that does not map onto that tradition. m:…7335

'The Second Amendment recognizes a robust right to bear arms within civil society that can rarely be circumvented by the sovereign,' the court wrote, in an opinion attributed to Judge Matey. The panel also held that the administrative relief process under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) does not foreclose an as-applied challenge — which suggests the courthouse, not the agency, remains the forum. m:…7335

The panel's historical move is the aggressive one: the modern 'felon' label — any crime punishable by more than a year — is, in its telling, a statutory invention with no analogue in the tradition the doctrine demands. That framing does not just help Edward Williams; this suggests it invites every non-violent felon in the circuit to relitigate. Whether the full court takes that invitation is the question the opinion leaves hanging. m:…7335